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Croissance économique, inégalité et qualité de l’environnement : une 
analyse empirique appliquée aux pays en développement et en transition  
 
Résumé 
Cet article a pour objectif d’analyser la relation qui prévaut entre les inégalités 
sociales et le degré de pollution. D’une part, il propose une revue de la littérature 
qui montre que d’un point de vue théorique, une diminution des inégalités a un 
effet indéterminé sur l’environnement. D’autre part, sur la base de ces 
discussions théoriques, nous proposons une analyse économétrique portant sur un 
échantillon de pays en développement et de pays en transition sur la période 
1988-2003. Plus précisément, nous examinons l’effet des inégalités sur le degré 
de pollution locale (émissions de dioxyde soufre et pollution organique de l’eau) 
en intégrant l’indice de Gini dans la formulation de la courbe environnementale 
de Kuznets. Deux effets sont alors testés : (i) un effet direct des inégalités sur la 
pollution : (ii) un effet indirect par lequel les inégalités agit sur la pollution par 
l’intermédiaire de son influence sur le degré de libertés politiques. 
Mots-clés : pollution ; inégalités ; courbe environnementale de Kuznets ; données 
de panel 
 
Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality: An empirical 
analysis applied to developing and transition countries 
 
Abstract 
This article aims at examining the relationship between social inequalities and 
pollution. On the one hand, it proposes a survey which shows that from a 
theoretical point of view, a decrease in inequality has an undetermined effect on 
environment. On the other hand, on the basis of these theoretical considerations, 
we propose an econometric analysis based on panel data for developing and 
transition countries during the period 1988-2003. More precisely, we examine the 
effect of income inequalities on the degree of local pollution (sulphur dioxide 
emissions and organic water pollution) by integrating Gini index in the 
formulation of environmental Kuznets curve. Then, two effects may be tested: (i) a 
direct effect of inequalities on pollution; (ii) an indirect effect by which the degree 
of inequality influence pollution by his negative impact on political freedoms. 
Keywords: pollution; inequality; environmental Kuznets curve; panel data  
JEL : C23 ; Q01 ; Q53 ; Q5 
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1 - Introduction 
The globalization and intensification of environmental degradations induced by the 
contemporary mode of development question the long-term viability of the globalization process. The 
accumulation of wealth is today considered through the prism of its sustainability. The critics, in a 
more or less radical way, call into question the regulation mechanisms that govern the relations 
between economic systems and environment. The neo-classic authors pretend that the market remains 
the most efficient institution to integrate ecological constraints, on the double condition that these 
externalities are internalized and the technological progress is circulated. Heterodox economists 
dispute this optimist version of market failures, and wonder about the necessity to adopt another 
paradigm of economic development.  
Nowadays the relationships between the human activities and their environment are approached 
through the concept of sustainable development (CMED, 1987). Its three pillars, economic, social and 
ecological, interact to lead the society on the path of a long-term viable growth. In order to determine 
the conditions of sustainability, most of the authors focus on the link-up between economic and 
environmental spheres. This paper aims at studying the consequences of the inclusion of the social 
relations’ influence. Behind the impact of the GDP per capita, isn’t it that the social and power 
inequalities play a prominent part regarding the evolution of the relations between environment and 
society? 
Right in the heart of all paradigms of sustainable development, lies the question of long-term 
compatibility between economic growth and a reasonable use of the capacities of assimilation of our 
ecosystems and natural resources. In the standard approach, sustainability fosters a dependence link 
towards the per capita GDP growth. But as from the 1990’s, some empiric studies put forward the idea 
that economic growth and respect of ecological constraints are compatible in the long run. Known as 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), this analysis postulates that the impact of anthropogenic 
activities on natural environment obeys a differentiated dynamism according to the level of per capita 
income (Grosman and Krueger, 1994; Seden and Song, 1994; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; 
World Bank, 1992). In a formal way, the relation between polluting emissions and the per capita GDP 
level takes the shape of an inverted-U curve.  
The EKC concept thus postulates that there is a reversal threshold of the relation, beyond which 
the increase of wealth becomes compatible with an improvement of the societies’ environmental 
performances. The variations of per capita GDP have an indirect effect on the pollution level, thanks 
to the combination of three structural effects: 
The scale effect expresses the impact of an increase of the economic activity. It estimates 
the additional quantity of pollution that would be generated if the intensity in GDP 
emissions would remain constant. 
The composition effect evaluates the consequences of sector-based mutations throughout 
the development process. First, the transition from a rural economy to an urban and 
industrial society aggravates the polluting rejects. Then, the decline in heavy energy-
intensive industries as well as the emergence of the service sector, intensive in terms of 
technology and human capital, release the ecological constraint by exerting a lowering 
action on the GDP’s emissions intensity.   
The technological effect estimates the decisive influence exerted by the organisational 
and scientific progress for the research linked to economic growth’s sustainability. From 
a certain level of wealth, both State and enterprises have the human and financial means 
to incur consistent R&D amounts to promote innovations for a better ecological 
efficiency of the manufacturing processes.  Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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Therefore, the existence of an EKC supposes that beyond a certain income per capita threshold, 
the two other effects more than make up for the scale effect.  
One of the main critics towards EKC lies in its deterministic nature. If the wealthy economies 
manage to reduce their polluting emissions owing to their economic growth, then they become an 
example to be followed by the national models of capital accumulation in developing countries. 
Sustainability would then be a kind of sixth step of development, extending the Rostow model 
(Vivien, 2006). Several authors insist on the omission of explanatory variables for the pollutions level, 
whose effect would be to artificially curve the EKC. In this paper, we focus on the potential impact of 
inequalities. At international level, the theme of “pollution havens” is still the subject of controversy. 
If the Northern countries’ environmental legislations go together with a relocation of their most 
polluting industries in developing countries (with less stringent standards) then the inverted-U curve 
looses its pertinence. It then becomes the result of the capacity of consumers issued from the 
wealthiest countries to put the burden of the pollutions resulting from production activities onto the 
populations who live in the less developed countries, instead of being the result of an effective 
improvement of the wealthiest economies (Mani and Wheeler, 1998; Rock, 1996 ; Stern et al., 1996; 
Baumol and Oates, 1988). The development inequalities then have an upward influence on the 
ecological degradations in the poorest countries.  
Within the framework of this paper, we analyse the effects of the introduction of inequalities 
variables in the EKC. This analysis presents a double perspective. On the one hand, it is a theoretical 
work aiming at identifying the economical, social and political mechanisms that could justify the 
nature of the relation between inequalities and environment. On the other hand, this work is completed 
by an empirical analysis that aims at examining the link between inequality and pollution over the 
1988-2003 period for developing and transition countries. With this objective, the first part proposes a 
synthesis of the theoretical discussions about the relation between wealth inequalities and pollution. 
The second part describes the samples and data that are mobilized. Then, in a third part, several 
econometric investigations are proposed in order to highlight a few stylised facts about the relation 
between inequalities and two specific pollutants, i.e. the sulphur dioxide emissions and the water's 
organic pollution.  
2 - Impact of inequalities on the environment: a critical 
analysis of the environmental Kuznets curve 
The overall idea that we are submitting hinges on the representation of the groups of interest. 
The poor, being the main victims of local pollutions, have an immediate potential benefit from the 
reduction of environmental degradations. But the more non-egalitarian a country is, the least the poor 
is properly represented in both institutions and social compromises. Therefore, the most elitist 
countries should also be the ones with the lowest regulations regarding the relations between economy 
and environment. However, since the pollutants have multiple sources, they obey different dynamics 
and we thus think that there is no unique sequence, but, on the contrary, some indeterminacy about the 
concrete logics related to the links between inequalities and respect of the ecosystem.  
2.1. An uncertain impact from an economic point of view 
2.1.1. The position of the institutions in the stabilization of the usual 
behaviours towards environment  
In the neo-classical paradigm, pollution is a public good that generates some markets 
externalities and failures. Therefore, there cannot be any spontaneous and universal movement behind 
the EKC. Public intervention is indispensable to stabilize behaviours and to let emerge some 
conventions for a sustainable development. Public policies are thus the essential factor, a mediator of 
the relation between the GDP per capita and the level of pollution. Generally speaking, the institutions Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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and especially the State influence the movement of technical progress through the mobilization of 
regulating tools (norms, taxes or ad hoc market).  
In their reference paper, Arrow et al. (1995) remind us that this curve is above all the result of 
action of authorities, instead of spontaneous dynamics. Similarly, according to Grossman and Krueger 
(1996, p. 120), “if environmental improvements are mediated by changes in government policy, then 
growth and development cannot be a substitute for environmental policy”. However, the interests 
related to environmental uses are contradictory. The causes and consequences of certain polluting 
activities do not affect all the actors in the same way. The capital holders have an interest in carrying 
on production at the minimum cost. Most often, the victims are not these people, but rather the very 
users of a degraded ecosystem (dwelling, water consumption, etc.). Then, the public intervention 
depends on the representation of these groups.    
Even though the ecological constraint is invested with an objective aspect, there is still a 
problem of societal perception of the ecological stakes. The spatial and temporal gap between the 
emission sources and a full understanding of the degradations explains the radical uncertainty in which 
the actors are. Furthermore, once the ecosystems' resilience is over, the phenomena are irreversible 
and prevent an efficient implementation of political management; there is no way back once 
environmental losses have incurred. Thus, the actors' behaviours must be guided by a collective 
anticipation of ecological risks. As for the spatial dimension, the local pollutions might lead to 
dynamics of land segregation, through which the wealthiest people can get away from deteriorated 
places while the poorest ones have no choice but to move in durably in polluted areas with cheaper 
rents.  
2.1.2. The Power-weighted social decision rule 
When it comes to polluting activities, Boyce (1994) formalizes the effects of power inequalities 
between winners and losers according to the pollution level
1. The neoclassical theory suggests two 
ideal-type situations: the laissez-faire and the social optimality à la Coase. In the first case, the winners 
ignore the costs born by the victims and carry on their polluting activity until the point where the 
marginal benefits become null. The pollution level is then maximal. If the winners are forced to take 
into account the increasing marginal costs of the losers, then social optimality is reached when these 
costs equal the marginal benefits of the polluters. However, the existence of transaction costs leads to 
a practical result situated in between these two ideal-types.  
Then, Boyce adds another angle to this dynamic: the power inequalities between winners and 
losers, defined ‘as the ability to bear transaction costs’. The relations of strength then lead to the 
concrete formation of a compromise that strays from social optimum. Boyce calls this new decision 
rule the “power-weighted social decision rule” (PWSDR). According to the author, the PWSDR's 
direction is not indeterminate; in most cases the winners from degradations are the ones who have a 
greater relative power.  
The power of a group is positively correlated to its level of relative wealth. Thus, the stronger 
the social inequalities are, the more the wealthiest people are able to maintain their interests. Yet, they 
are the ones who get the largest benefits from environmental deterioration. Rich people are thus at the 
source of a wider range of production and often consume goods that are more polluting (like big-
engine cars for instance) than the ones used by poor people. Furthermore, they hold an overwhelming 
part of financial assets and thus capture the largest part of the producer surplus whose immediate 
interest is costs minimization, like a minimal undertaking of social costs. Boyce names this relation 
between wealth inequalities, power inequalities and pollution ‘equality hypothesis’, reflecting the idea 
that a better social equality favours the preservation of environmental quality.  
                                                 
1 One can also refer to Boyce (2003, 2007). Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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Boyce identifies a few additional arguments that imply a negative influence of inequalities over 
the environment quality. First, the ecological irreversibility implies that a modification of power that 
favours the winners of degradations increases the long-term under-optimality of the pollution levels, 
but the opposite cannot work when the degradations have already happened and become irreparable. 
Second, the environment evaluation leads to a fictitious price, integrated in the price vector. However, 
price formation is influenced by the play of paying capacities, themselves depending on the initial 
distribution of wealth. The level of social inequalities is thus an additional channel of influence for the 
well-to-do classes. Likewise, the access to information is less performing for poor people and although 
they are the victims, they underestimate the impact of degradations. Besides, wealthy people have the 
ability to influence social compromises through the manipulation of information via marketing and 
media control. Third, rich people fear that social protest movements could put an end to their 
privileges. Such fear prompts them to increase their preference for the present (i.e. to overvalue the 
discount rate). They will thus increase the production level of polluting activities in order to maximize 
their current results, thus encouraging an increase of polluting emissions or a higher exploitation of 
natural resources.    
Scruggs (1998) goes back on these theoretical developments to show that the whole of Boyce's 
architecture lies on the hypothesis that the wealthy people systematically prefer a degraded 
environment. She contests this idea by recalling that the literature suggests on the contrary that the 
quality of environment is a superior good whose demand increases faster than the income. Then, a 
non-egalitarian society should lead towards less environmental degradations
2. Referring to the new 
paradigm of social modernization (Hofrichter and Reif, 1990), Scruggs asserts that there would be a 
threshold of average individual wealth beyond which the direction of the impact of inequalities on 
pollutions reverses. In the poorest countries, Boyce's assumption would be verified, but in the most 
developed countries, the inequalities would be in favour of environment preservation. She thus 
concludes that the relation between inequalities and ecological degradations cannot be one-to-one, but 
rather indeterminate. However, Scruggs only considers the debate through the terms of consumer's 
wealth, while the wealthiest classes are also the ones that have the largest interests in the production 
activities, and thus in the achievement of producer surplus (cf. supra). 
2.1.3. Comments: the multiple influences of inequalities on 
environmental degradations 
The debate between Boyce and Scruggs shows how complex the relation is between inequalities 
and environment. Such complexity is related to the multitude of underlying mechanisms that often act 
contradictorily.  
The limits to growth 
A key aspect of the debate is widely overlooked. If, at least in rich countries, the sustainability 
conditions imply the restriction of production growth for material goods, then the role of social 
inequalities appears from an angle that is wider than the direct impact of their dynamics on 
environmental quality. The emergence of an ecological constraint becomes an objective’s limit 
enforced on the production scale, whose non-respect would inevitably create humanitarian disasters. 
All in all, the rich countries have reached a stage of undeniable opulence. But such material affluence 
remains relative. In Northern countries, a large proportion of individuals are still poor, and in Southern 
countries, the economies are far from reaching the levels of individual average wealth similar to that 
                                                 
2 The role of an increasing marginal utility of environmental quality is not as obvious as Scruggs would say. 
Indeed, even in this case, a wealthy consumer might be confronted with the necessity of comparing the 
usefulness of protecting any ecosystem and the opportunity cost of the renunciation to the buying of a polluting 
asset. For instance, a European whose financial assets allow him to spend holidays in the Maldives will have to 
give a very high marginal utility to the fight against climatic changes in order to give up the plane that would 
take him to this paradise place! Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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of Occident. Therefore, the stakes today lie more in the share of material wealth than in growth as 
such, since it has to stay within sustainable limits. Within the framework of our article, limited to the 
groups of Southern and transition countries, this primary acknowledgement can be used as our horizon 
line. Indeed, it demonstrates the inner limits of the current development in the North, a development 
that cannot be identically reproduced, from a quantitative point of view. This acknowledgement 
speaks in favour of a behaviour centred on the fair share of wealth, in order to minimize the need of 
growth. Besides, Sen (1981) supports this reasoning when he demonstrates that Indian famines 
occurred even though the granaries were full, because of the failure of the Indian redistribution 
system.  
The scale effect of social inequalities reduction 
The reduction of social inequalities can also put the ecosystems at a disadvantage. Indeed, the 
propensity to consume being a decreasing function to the income, a policy axed on incomes 
redistribution leads to a consumption increase that is more than proportional to the decrease of the 
riches’ consumption. Moreover, the assets bought by middle class households might be of poorer 
quality, and more polluting. Such dynamics is especially true in transition countries, in which the 
middle class is fast increasing.  
A differentiated impact of inequalities according to the pollutant’s type 
Environmental degradations have many sources, and thus the impact of inequalities cannot be 
systematically the same. For instance, environmental amenities such as natural parks are a common 
asset with the characteristics of a superior good. On the other hand, the location of urban wastes 
processing plants rather obeys the logics of land segregation, according to the intensity of 
degradations. The spatial pollution scale affects the ability of wealthy people to protect themselves 
from degradations. The more localized the effects of a pollutant are, the more one can expect an 
aggravating impact of social inequalities. Similarly, the split between acts of production and 
consumption have an influence on the inequalities impact and its direction (Khanna and Plassmann, 
2004). 
The technological progress  potential  
The technological ability to adopt production methods with lower pollution is also a strategic 
variable. If such option can be reached, wealthy households will be in a position to buy less polluting, 
but more expensive products. Then, the inequalities can have a positive impact on environment quality 
because they increase the demand for such innovating products.  
Societal perception 
The social and power inequalities act directly on the development of societal perception. As we 
earlier reminded, the poorest categories are also very often the ones who are head-on affected by 
micro-pollutions. Therefore, they are the best “informed” about environmental violations, especially 
when pollutions affect vital ecological services such as drinking water consumption. But within the 
public institutions, the more the mechanisms to defend the most vulnerable are weak the more the 
wealth distribution is distorted in favour of the riches. Their economic interests are not properly 
relieved and this asymmetry is also present in their environmental interests. Since the wealthiest 
individuals have a stronger ability to protect themselves from local pollutions (or to “feel” protected), 
there is a chance that the society underestimates environment violations. This reasoning applies 
without the necessity to express the assumption that the wealthiest groups are inevitably in favour of 
environment degradations. Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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Survival activities and access inequalities 
The impact of inequalities on environment also has several sources, and thus several 
consequences. Social inequalities are at the source of a direct interest for the most vulnerable people in 
deteriorating their environment because of survival motivations. They might indeed have no other 
choice but to make an excessive withdrawal on the natural endowments of their ecosystems in order to 
draw some minimum incomes. Deforestation linked to the cultivation of new lands or smuggling of 
protected species can be, if not encouraged, at least not constrained by public authorities to minimize 
the risk of protest movements. The effects of inequalities on living conditions can be amplified by 
some feedbacks like a pathogen impoverishment of the services issued from degraded ecosystems. 
Such sequence concerns before and above all the poorest countries. A direct effect of inequalities on 
the ecosystems is generated by access inequalities, especially in developing countries. For example, if 
a territory only has a limited access to safe drinking water, it is in principle the poorest ones who will 
be the most affected by water rationing. If the governance fails to take properly into account the 
interest of the poorest people, the construction of infrastructures dedicated to an improvement of the 
drinking water supply might fall very short. Easterly (2001) stresses that inequalities are one of the 
main causes of the freeze of the development process, one thing that, in return, perpetuates the 
unsustainable pressures on the ecosystems related to survival activities.  
The risk of a growth’s acceleration that would annihilate the control of its content 
The aggravating impact of inequalities is also found in the interest of authorities in non-
egalitarian countries to accelerate the rhythm of wealth creation (in order to compensate strong 
inequalities). This refers to the ability or to the will of public institutions to create some institutional 
conditions that would favour a strong economic growth in order to keep their political legitimacy. The 
EKC scale effect is thus amplified and accordingly the environment is quickly deteriorated. Indeed, 
the faster the economic growth is, the least possible it is to control the very content of this growth, and 
therefore its ecological effects.  An exemplary case of these noxious dynamics is China.  
Power inequalities relieved by democracy?  
Lastly, the supposed superiority of certain democratic configurations to better take into account 
the interest of the most vulnerable is also often considered in economic literature. The interests of each 
social group are better taken into account in nations with free elections, thanks to the voter status of 
each actor. The State, through its governing people, thus takes a better care of the needs of the poorest. 
The ecological problems are thus managed in a more voluntaristic way. However, we would like to 
qualify this optimism (although we do not aim at fundamentally questioning it). First, in 
configurations where challenges are badly perceived because they have not yet occurred, a large 
majority of these groups can find an interest in carrying on polluting activities without constraining 
them (for example, in order not to reduce the employment in these industries). There are then little 
chances that the political power takes the risk of imposing some unpopular measures, even though 
there is proper information from the scientific community. Furthermore, in certain Western countries 
(USA for example), social inequalities are very high and the positive effect of the democratic work on 
the environmental performances might then be threatened. Lastly, the cultural imagination of these 
mass consumption societies is often in direct conflict with the necessity to restrict the activity of 
polluting industries. In a market economy, the necessity to keep on expanding the outlets finds one of 
its solutions in the permanent creation of new needs. Such dynamics often contradict the “self-
restriction” requirement in goods demand. For instance, the number of vehicles must be reduced to 
fight climatic changes, but the current trend is the opposite, even though a few marginal improvements 
are being done (decrease in the vehicles’ fuel consumption). Moreover, through social representations, 
the inequalities probably intensify these difficulties because the poorest people tend to mimic the 
ostentatious behaviours of the riches. This is even more pertinent when one knows that the poorest 
people can only afford the lowest products in terms of quality, and therefore the most polluting ones 
(an aggravating factor on the EKC scale effect). In the end, some powerful contradictions might exist Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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between the beneficial effect of a democratic system on ecological performance and the logics of a 
market economy.  
2.2. Empirical findings 
There is quite an abundant empirical literature on the relation between environment and 
inequalities. The present survey is restricted to the main articles that deal specifically with the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve and the impact of inequalities. 
Torras and Boyce (1998) were the first authors to analyze these issues. In this conflict of interest 
between net winners and losers, the public authorities judge according to the respective efficiency of 
the representation within the institutions of both these groups. Yet, according to the PWSDR, the 
winners group owns a stronger negotiation power. In their analysis, Torras and Boyce thus try to 
demonstrate that the inequalities interact with the per capita GDP level, raising the EKC reversal 
threshold. Indeed, according to Kuznets himself, power inequalities, underlying a same level of 
income dispersion, are all the more high that the GDP per capita is weak, something the authors call 
the ‘Kuznets unsung hypothesis’. They then estimate the equation that links the pollution level to a 
vector of control variables, to the level of GDP per capita and to the negotiation power. This latter is 
approximated by the Gini index, the literacy rate and an indicator of civil rights and political freedom
3. 
They mostly mobilize data issued from the GEMS database for the pollutant concentrations during the 
1977-1991’s period in 18-52 cities out of 19-42 countries according to the type of pollution. After 
having estimated the regressions without inequality variables and having noticed that the results are 
similar to the Grossman and Krueger (1995) ones, they include them by adding a dummy that marks 
the membership of the group of either poor or rich countries. Then the coefficients loose their 
significance. All in all, the inequalities have a significant upwards impact on pollution, especially for 
the poorest countries. In other words, the weaker the per capita GDP level is, the more the social and 
power inequalities have an influence on the degradation of the environmental quality, thus confirming 
the ‘Kuznets’ unsung hypothesis’. 
Scruggs (1998) tests the ‘equality hypothesis’, according to which a reduction of inequalities 
improves the environment. The observations that are utilized come from two distinct databases: the 
United Nations GEMS base on water (dissolved oxygen and faeces) and air (SO2 and particles 
concentrations) quality and a sample only made of 17 industrial democracies. The results go towards 
an indeterminacy of the direction of the impact of inequalities on ecological degradations. In the first 
set of regressions, only the indicators of dissolved oxygen and particles are significantly correlated 
with the Gini index. Moreover, the expected sign is only observed with the first indicator. In the 
second set, the results are also ambiguous, since the inequalities variables are not significant (except 
for a particular regression, and yet the sign goes towards a positive impact of inequalities on the 
environmental quality) and the GDP per capita acts contrarily to the EKC dynamics.  
However, the majority of empirical studies go in the direction of a negative impact of 
inequalities on the environmental quality. Boyce et al. (1999) thus get some results in 50 USA states, 
in accordance with the ‘equality hypothesis’. Gawande et al. (2001) study the relation between the 
location of toxic wastes sites and the income level of United States households. They clearly 
demonstrate that, behind the EKC look, hides in fact the financial ability of the wealthy households to 
get away from pollution sources. When getting richer, individuals tend to try to move away from 
polluting places rather than influence the public policies in favour of a significant decrease of toxic 
wastes. Mikkelson et al. (2007) concludes that the inequalities increase the number of endangered 
species
4. Gates et al (2007) underline a significant and indirect relation between social inequalities and 
ecosystems preservation through their negative impact on political freedom. Furthermore, inequalities 
                                                 
3 They apply OLS, which, in our view, appears to restrict their results, panel data methods being more relevant. 
4 They also find a U-shaped curve with GDP per capita, an inverse EKC-type curve. Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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also have a direct negative relation with the percentage of land holding the status of protected natural 
parks and with the quality of available information on environmental conditions.   
3. Data 
In order to test the relation between inequalities and environmental quality, we mobilize an 83 
countries sample, comprising 67 developing countries and 16 transition countries (CEEC and ex-
soviet republics) for which we have observations throughout the 1988-2003 period. The database 
presents a panel structure and thus allows to capture the heterogeneity among countries through the 
introduction of some effects that are specific to the individuals and to capture temporal dynamics 
through the introduction of some effects that are specific to the years. 
Because there are no composite indicators of environment quality, two pollution variables are 
taken into account, with the requirement of only referring to local pollutants. First, the data on sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) emissions spring from the ASL database and its update proposed by David Stern for the 
1990's and 2000's (ASL and Associates, 1997; Stern, 2005). They are expressed in kg per capita. 
Second, the observations on water organic pollution are taken from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators 2007 and are expressed in kg per worker. 
Inequality data, grasped by the Gini index, come from the World Income Inequality Database of 
the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER). This database gathers about 5000 
observations taken from multiple sources and graded according to their quality. Whenever possible, 
we retained high quality observations that are homogeneous in terms of measurement unit and covered 
population. However, these inequalities’ data raise two difficulties. First, they present a problem of 
comparability because the households surveys used to estimate the distribution of the standard of 
living are based on distinct sampling methods and also because the indicator of the standard of living 
that is utilized is not homogeneous among countries
5. Second, the data on inequalities are very 
parsimonious. This is why the panel is not balanced. Indeed, out of 1328 theoretical observations (67 
countries and 16 years), we only have 412 observations for the Gini index.   
To take the political situation into account, we turn to the political rights index built each year 
by the non-governmental organization Freedom House. It particularly measures the extent of political 
freedom according to four criteria: (i) the extent of freedom in electoral processes, (ii) the pluralism, 
(iii) the citizen’s participation in political life, (iv) the governments’ functioning. Taking these criteria 
into account, the indicator grades the countries according to the extent of their political freedom, grade 
7 corresponding to a very restrained level of political rights and grade 1 to a democratic regime. All 
other explanatory variables used in the analysis (the GDP per capita expressed in constant dollars of 
2000, the literacy rate, and the share of energy exports in total exports) are taken from the World 
Development Indicators. 
4. Results  
4.1. Environmental Kuznets curve 
In order to test the validity of the EKC, we retain a three degree polynomial form for the relation 
between the pollution level and the GDP per capita. Moreover, because of the double dimension of the 
data (individual and temporal), we resort to linear panel models, that is, the fixed effects model and the 
random-effects model, by integrating both individual and temporal effects
6. The expression of the 
fixed effects model is given by:  
                                                 
5 For comparability problems, please refer to Deiniger and Squire (1996, 1998) 
6  For technical aspects related to these two models, refer to Baltagi (1995).  Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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2 1              (1) 
With  POL as the pollution level and GDPh  as the per capita GDP. The fixed effects are 
constants to be estimated that are specific to the countries (αi) and to the years (λt) and that capture the 
influence of non-observable characteristics, respectively constants along the time and constants 
between individuals. The fixed effects model estimator is the least squares with dummy variables 
estimator (LSDV) which is equivalent to the ordinary least squares (OLS) applied to the individual 
averages deviation model. The expression of the random-effects model is given by: 




2 1             (2) 
Here, both individual and temporal effects are supposed to be random (ui). And, taking into 
account a particular form of self-correlation of the wastes, the model is estimated through the 
generalized least squares (GLS). 
Tables 1a and 1b respectively present the results for SO2  emissions and for water organic 
pollution. The explanatory capacity of the models is satisfactory for transition countries, but rather 
limited for developing countries as well as for the sample as a whole. We must also precise that the 
Chow test implemented for the fixed-effects model confirms the relevance of these two sub-samples, 
no matter the pollutant considered. The Hausman test that enables to choose between the fixed-effects 
model and the random-effects model produces some contradictory results according to the sample and 
pollutant. However, in four cases out of six, a random-effects model will be preferred.      
As for sulphur dioxide emissions, we excluded the cubic term of GDP per capita from the 
regressions because of its non-significance. All in all, it seems that the relation between SO2 emissions 
and GDP per capita takes the shape of a U-inverted curve, in accordance with the EKC hypothesis. 
The turning point is relatively high (between USD 7,700 and USD 7,900 according to the models) and 
more or less corresponds to the Chile or Russia’s average level of development over the given period. 
The implementation of distinct estimations for developing and transition countries shows that the 
relation is not stable. The EKC seems to be validated in the ex-socialist countries. But this result 
requires more attention. Indeed, with the exception of Macedonia, one notes a decrease of SO2 
emissions in all transition countries
7 in the considered period. For example, the SO2 emissions per 
capita have decreased by 88% in the Czech Republic, by 70% in Hungary and by 57% in Bulgaria. 
How can we then justify the increasing part of the relation? This increasing part is related to the inter-
individual variability (between countries) of the GDP per capita and emissions, while the decreasing 
part would rather be related to the inter-temporal variability and traduce the decrease of emissions as 
time goes by. Therefore, the observed EKC is artificial in a certain way, because of the confusion 
between inter-temporal and intra-temporal dimensions. As for the developing countries, the 
estimations show the absence of a significant quadratic relation between the SO2 emissions per capita 
and the GDP per capita. However, when one excludes the squared GDP per capita, one notes the 
existence of an increasing linear relation that is significant from a statistical point of view. This linear 
relation is confirmed by the scatter plot found in annexes (Chart A2) and the value of the linear 
correlation coefficient (significant and positive). In other words, the developing countries might have 
not yet reached the threshold that marks the transition to a phase of decreasing emissions, in 
accordance with the EKC.  
                                                 
7 For SO2, emissions, the group of transition countries is exclusively made out of CEEC, since there is no 
available data for the ex-soviet republics.  Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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Table 1a: Regression results for the determinants of SO2 emissions, fixed-effects model 
(FEM) and random-effects model (REM). 
                          
  Whole sample    Developing countries    Transition countries 
  FEM (1)  REM (2)     FEM (1)  REM (2)     FEM (1)  REM (2) 
             
Constant   -8,4564      2,8239    -46,8553 
   -3,10***      1,30    -2,14** 
GDPh  0,0091 0,0080   0,0010  0,0011    0,0230 0,0216 
  9,27*** 9,90***   1,42  1,67*    4,73*** 4,82*** 
GDPh²  -5,85E-07 -5,10E-07   6,39E-08  6,09E-08  -1,34E-06 -1,25E-06 
  -9,90*** -9,75***   1,27  1,29   -5,57*** -5,52*** 
             
N  957  957    836  836    121  121 
R²  0,0999  0,0998  0,0726  0,0726  0,2545  0,2544 
Hausman  test  1,21  (0,2721)  0,04  (0,8327)  0,53  (0,4654) 
Chow test  1,63 (0,0011)*** 
Turning point  7778  7843              8582  8640 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for regression coefficients and significance level for the Hausman and Chow tests. 
*** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; * statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 1b: Regression results for the determinants of organic water pollution, fixed-
effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM). 
                          
  Whole sample    Developing countries    Transition countries 
  FEM (1)  REM (2)     FEM (1)  REM (2)     FEM (1)  REM (2) 
             
Constant   0,3084     0,2447     0,4441 
   29,18***     24,77***     15,33*** 
GDPh  -6,96E-05 -5,02E-05    -1,41E-05 -1,64E-05    -1,37E-04 -1,23E-04 
  -11,44*** -10,24***    -2,66*** -3,75***    -9,72*** -9,29*** 
GDPh²  7,38E-09 5,47E-09    1,67E-09 1,87E-09    1,64E-08 1,53E-08 
  9,92*** 8,36***    2,67*** 3,38***    8,27*** 7,96*** 
GDPh
3  -2,40E-13 -1,82E-13    -5,60E-14 -6,18E-14    -6,21E-13 -5,91E-13 
  -8,67*** -7,17***    -2,52** -3,04***    -7,13*** -7,00*** 
             
N  785  785    589  589    196  196 
R²  0,1887  0,1893  0,1179  0,1279  0,3279  0,3402 
Hausman test  28,95 (0,0000)***    0,62 (0,4325)    8,42 (0,0037)*** 
Chow test  1,74 (0,0002)*** 
Turning  point             
Min  7352  7116  6082  6443  6814  6373 
Max  13148  12921    13799  13730    10792  10886 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for regression coefficients and significance level for the Hausman and Chow tests. 
*** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; * statistically significant at 10% level. 
The relation between water organic pollution and development level is different since it takes 
the shape of an inverted-N curve that goes against the EKC 's predictions. Furthermore, this relation 
seems to be stable because it is observed for both transition and developing countries. However, the 
final decreasing part of the relation does not really mean anything since there are only two countries 
(South Korea and Czech Republic) presenting some average levels of GDP per capita greater than the 
curve's maximum (situated around USD 13,000). The concept of a development level beyond which 
the water pollution would decrease is likely, but this threshold is high and only concerns a few 
countries of the sample. Therefore, the relation between water pollution and development level rather 
takes the shape of a U curve as far as our sample is concerned.  
Finally, the relation between environment deterioration and GDP per capita depends on the 
pollutant and on the group of considered countries. Like Gates et al. (2002) and He et al. (2007), we 
defend the idea that the relation between pollution and development level depends on factors that are 
related to the social and political situation.  Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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4.2. Pollution, inequalities and political rights 
It is advisable to test the hypothesis according to which the relation between pollution and 
wealth level cannot be understood without taking into account the social and political dimensions. 
Therefore, we first integrate the degree of inequalities (measured by the Gini index) in the previous 
regressions, in accordance with the following equation related to the random-effects model:  




2 1                               (3) 
  Secondly, we introduce the political situation, captured by the political rights index (POLIT) : 




2 1         (4) 
  Lastly, in order to test the interaction between inequality and the extent of political freedom, 
we take into account a differentiated effect of the Gini index, depending on whether the country 
present a democratic regime (political rights index from 1 to 3) or an authoritarian one (political rights 
index above 3). The equation of the random-effects model is then given by: 




2 1    (5) 
With DEM and DIC two dummy variables respectively indicating whether the political regime 
of the country is rather democratic or authoritarian, at the considered date. We only present the 
estimations of the random-effects models, respectively for SO2  emissions (table 2a) and water 
pollution (table 2b). 
Table 2a: Regression results for the determinants of SO2 emissions, random-effects 
model 
                                   
  Whole sample    Developing countries    Transition countries 
  (3) (4) (5)      (3) (4) (5)      (3) (4) (5) 
                 
Constant  0,6208 -7,1245 -1,9341    -0,5999 -1,0385 -0,2399   1,4036 -18,9184 0,1258 
  0,10 -1,14 -0,34    -0,13 -0,21 -0,05    0,05 -0,78 0,01 
GDPh  0,0086 0,0089 0,0084   0,0014  0,0015  0,0014  0,0164 0,0142 0,0141 
  7,52*** 8,15*** 7,82***   1,24  1,26  1,16   3,35*** 3,41*** 3,33*** 
GDPh²  -5,90E-07 -6,12E-07 -5,94E-07  3,53E-08 3,34E-08 3,64E-08  -1,02E-06 -9,33E-07 -9,12E-07 
  -7,87*** -8,84*** -8,59***  0,38  0,36  0,39   -4,25*** -4,60*** -4,39*** 
Gini  -0,2261  -0,1286     0,0552  0,0554     -0,9655  -0,1035  
  -1,90*  -1,20     0,65  0,65     -1,95*  -0,22  
Political  freedoms  0,7212      0,0796      2,5576   
   1,60      0,23       1,89*   
Gini_democracy     -0,1448       0,0669       -0,5653 
     -1,35       0,78       -1,35 
Gini_dictature    -0,1658       0,0411       -0,5625 
     -1,51       0,48       -1,23 
                 
N  310 307 307      228 228 228      82  79  79 
R²  0,2417 0,2917 0,2701    0,0830 0,0840 0,0876    0,3747 0,4924 0,4417 
Turning  point  7288 7271 7071           8039 7610 7730 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for regression coefficients. 
*** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; * statistically significant at 10% level. Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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Table 2b: Regression results for the determinants of organic water pollution, random-
effects model 
                                   
Variables  Whole sample    Developing countries    Transition countries 
explicatives  (3) (4) (5)      (3) (4) (5)      (3) (4) (5) 
                 
Constant  0,2554 0,2699 0,2613    0,2104 0,2160 0,2091    0,6276 0,6068 0,5880 
  10,56*** 10,62*** 11,21***   10,93*** 10,90*** 10,89***   9,53*** 8,56*** 8,77*** 
GDPh  -5,18E-05 -4,04E-05 -4,09E-05   -2,18E-05 -2,26E-05 -2,22E-05   -1,70E-04 -1,43E-04 -1,45E-04 
  -5,78*** -4,53*** -4,58***   -2,97*** -3,08*** -3,03***   -8,01*** -6,20***  -6,14 
GDPh²  6,74E-09 5,29E-09 5,36E-09   3,06E-09 3,09E-09 3,07E-09   2,05E-08 1,75E-08 1,78E-08 
  5,13*** 4,11*** 4,17***    3,05*** 3,08*** 3,06***    7,46*** 5,82 5,82*** 
GDPh
3  -2,70E-13 -2,19E-13 -2,22E-13   -1,17E-13 -1,17E-13 -1,17E-13   -7,68E-13 -6,72E-13 -6,81E-13 
  -4,82*** -4,03*** -4,09***   -2,90*** -2,90*** -2,90***   -6,99*** -5,59*** -5,62*** 
Gini  0,0011  4,41E-04    7,12E-04 7,58E-04      -0,0018 -0,0025   
  2,82***  1,17     2,22** 2,35**      -2,14** -2,91***   
Political  freedoms  -0,0022      -0,0013      -0,0049   
   -1,25      -1,18      -1,32  
Gini_democracy     5,91E-04       8,13E-04       -0,0021 
     1,56       2,44**       -2,47** 
Gini_dictature    3,51E-04       7,33E-04       -0,0025 
     0,92       2,28**       -2,97*** 
                 
N  259 254 254      160 160 160      99  94  94 
R²  0,2857 0,2717 0,2893    0,0823 0,1235 0,1162    0,4166 0,4652 0,4704 
Turning  point                 
Min  6021 6224 6215    4990 5182 5106    6578 6578 6491 
Max  10621  9879  9881     12445  12425  12387     11217  10783  10935 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for regression coefficients. 
*** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; * statistically significant at 10% level. 
When referring to the estimations for SO2  emissions, it appears that the Gini index has a 
negative effect significant at the 10% level on the degree of emissions for the whole sample [model 
(3)]. In other words, a high degree of inequalities would be associated to a reduction of emissions. 
However, when introducing the variable of political freedom, the Gini index looses its significance 
[model (4)].  Likewise, we do not get any significant result when taking into account the interaction 
between inequalities and extent of political rights [model (5)]. For the developing countries sample, 
the models have a weak explanatory power and the results are unconvincing since no variable 
(including the GDP per inhabitant) is statistically significant. For transition countries (only CEEC for 
SO2 emissions), the models have a better specification since the R² are systematically greater than 
0.35. When the inequality degree is the only integrated one, it has a negative effect significant at the 
10% level on SO2 emissions [model (3)]. In other words, an inequality increase would favour the 
reduction of emissions. But this result needs to be carefully examined. The reforms aimed at providing 
the transition towards a market economy have indeed resulted in a deep social upheaval, notably 
characterized by an outburst of inequalities, while they were moderate in the former system 
(Milanovic, 1998). It is also true that this increase of inequalities went together with a reduction of the 
SO2 emissions. But in our point of view, there is no causal relation between the evolution of the social 
context and the evolution of the emissions. The decrease of sulphur dioxide emissions is mainly 
explained by two factors, separate from the social context. First, this improvement is linked to the 
1990's economic crisis marked by a collapse of the industrial production. In second place, the increase 
of political rights related to the setting up of democratic regimes in most of the CEEC, as well as the 
perspectives of joining the European Union, did favour the emergence of environmental matters that 
were totally ignored under socialist regimes.  Therefore, in a certain way, the correlation between 
inequalities and SO2 emissions that has been underlined is misleading and certainly cannot identify any 
causality. This thesis is confirmed by model (4), since the impact of inequalities on SO2 emissions 
disappears when the indicator of political freedom is introduced. It becomes significant and positive, Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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indicating that an increase of political rights (decrease of the indicator of political rights) is favourable 
to a decrease of sulphur emissions.  
For the organic water pollution, the estimations display a positive effect of inequalities, 
significant at the 1% level, for the whole sample [model (3)].  But this significant impact disappears as 
soon as political freedoms are introduced in the regressions [models (4) and (5)]. Therefore, all in all, 
the effect of inequalities on water pollution is uncertain. For developing countries, the impact of 
inequalities is highly significant and the positive sign of the coefficient related to the Gini index 
indicates that a high degree of wealth inequalities prejudices the water quality [model (3)], in 
accordance with Boyce’s thesis (1994). The results also indicate that this effect is not constrained by 
the political system. Indeed, the introduction of an effect differentiated from the Gini index according 
to the political situation (democracy or dictatorship) does not modify the positive influence of the Gini 
index [model (5)]. For transition countries, the logics are strictly opposite, since the impact of 
inequalities on water pollution is negative and separate from the political system. Yet, when 
calculating a simple linear correlation coefficient, a positive correlation between inequalities and water 
pollution is observed. In other words, a high degree of inequalities would be associated to an important 
level of water pollution. Actually, the nature of the relation between pollution and inequalities is 
modified when one takes into account the level of wealth (GDP per capita). Once controlled by the 
level of wealth, an unequal distribution of wealth favours a reduction of the water pollution.  
In the end, the nature of the relation between pollution and inequality seems to be constrained by 
the pollutant and the group of observed countries. As for the SO2 emissions, it looks like the level of 
wealth exerts a stronger effect than its distribution. But the inequalities have a fundamental effect on 
water pollution. In developing countries, they reinforce the degree of water pollution, according to 
Boyce’s hypothesis, while the relation is opposite in transition countries, once controlled by the level 
of wealth.  
4.3. Instrumental variables techniques 
It is important to discuss the relevance of an indirect effect of inequalities on environmental 
degradations through the channel of politics. Along the same lines as Gates et al. (2002), we make the 
assumption that a high degree of wealth inequality, because it takes part to the degradation of political 
rights, would have an adverse effect on environment. More precisely, we propose to call up the 
techniques of instrumental variables on panel data by instrumenting the indicator of political freedoms 
with the Gini index (to test the indirect effect), the part of fuel exports in total exportations and the 
literacy rate. The point is actually to apply the two-stage least squares estimator to the fixed-effects 
model.  
The estimations are reported in table 3a for SO2 emissions and table 3b for water pollution. 
Taking into account the limited number of observations in transition countries (less than 60), the 
estimations where only implemented for the whole sample and developing countries. What’s more, for 
the latter, no significant result was obtained since there is no significant variable, even in terms of 
GDP per capita. On the other hand, the estimations call several comments for the global sample.  Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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Table 3a: Regression results for the determinants of SO2 emissions, fixed-effects model 
with instrumental variables 
                 
  Whole sample    Developing countries 
  (1)  (2)    (1)  (2) 
                 
GDPh  0,0072 0,0072   0,0038  0,0056 
  3,11*** 3,02***   1,07  0,51 
GDPh²  -4,56E-07 -4,58E-07   -6,48E-08  -1,60E-07 
  -3,54*** -3,44***   -0,28  -0,23 
Gini   0,0973     0,5275 
   0,3      0,37 
Political freedoms  2,7101  3,5122  4,6253  19,1712 
  1,71*  1,11  0,77  0,44 
         
N  212  212    170  170 
R²  0,1112  0,1415  0,0587  0,0781 
Turning point  7895  7860          
The index of political freedoms is instrumented with the Gini index, the share of fuel exports in total exportations and the 
literacy rate. 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for regression coefficients.  
*** statistically significant at 1% level ; ** statistically significant at 5% level ; * statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 3b: Regression results for the determinants of organic water pollution, fixed-
effects model with instrumental variables  
                 
 Whole  sample    Developing countries 
  (1)  (2)    (1)  (2) 
                 
GDPh  -1,40E-05 -1,16E-05    -1,71E-05 -1,63E-05 
  -0,51  -0,37  -0,70  -0,67 
GDPh²  3,20E-09 2,94E-09    2,88E-09 2,74E-09 
  1,04  0,85  1,06  1,02 
GDPh
3  -1,63E-13 -1,54E-13    -1,14E-13 -1,08E-13 
  -1,52  -1,28  -1,23  -1,18 
Gini   5,80E-04     4,04E-04 
   0,65     0,89 
Political freedoms  0,0137 0,0174   0,0037  0,0031 
  2,63*** 2,15**   0,18  0,15 
                 
N  178  178    125  125 
R²  0,2231 0,3805      0,2180 0,2694 
The index of political freedoms is instrumented with the Gini index, the share of fuel exports in total exportations and the 
literacy rate. 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for regression coefficients.  
*** statistically significant at 1% level ; ** statistically significant at 5% level ; * statistically significant at 10% level. 
First, for SO2  emissions, the EKC keeps its significance. And the political situation has a 
significant effect at the 10% level. More precisely, a worsening of the political situation, influenced by 
a high degree of inequalities, would favour an increase of SO2 emissions. However, this indirect effect 
of inequalities on SO2 emissions disappears when the Gini index is introduced (this index is supposed 
to capture the direct effect). All things considered and according to our previous conclusions, the 
inequalities seem to have a limited effect on SO2 emissions, since they are above all related to the level 
of wealth rather than its distribution.  
The results look more convincing with water pollution. The estimations highlight an indirect 
effect at the 1 to 5% level, depending whether the direct effect of inequality is integrated or not. The 
inequalities thus have an impact on the organic water pollution, in accordance with Boyce’s equality 
assumption (1994). Furthermore, the per capita GDP polynomial looses its significance when taking 
into account this indirect effect. This seems to confirm the idea that the relation between water Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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pollution and wealth is probably affected by a bias of omitted variables. This relation seems to be 
conditional on the degree of inequalities and its interaction with the political situation. Therefore, if we 
consider that poor people are the most affected ones by water pollution, it is likely that in a context of 
strong social inequalities and constrained political freedoms, these people do not have the possibility 
of asserting their interest in the preservation of water quality.  
5 - Conclusion 
This paper aimed at discussing the potential interactions between the social and environmental 
dimensions of sustainability. In this respect, we examined the role of wealth inequalities in the 
pollution process. From a theoretical point of view, the impact of social inequalities on pollution 
seems indeterminate because of multiple and contradictory mechanisms. Although Boyce (1994, 2003, 
2007) asserts that inequalities affect the environment because they reinforce the power inequalities (to 
the benefit of the wealthiest people), Scruggs (1998) questions this analysis by showing that it rests on 
a particularly questionable assumption according to which the wealthiest individuals systematically 
prefer a degraded environment.  
The econometric analysis made out of a sample of transition and developing countries have 
shown that the relation between inequality and pollution is not universal. It depends on both the 
pollutant and the context that are analysed. Regarding sulphur dioxide emissions, our investigations 
indicate that, in accordance with the hypothesis of environmental Kuznets curve, they depend above 
all on the level of wealth (GDP per capita), rather than on its distribution. In other words, the 
inequalities would only have a limited influence on SO2 emissions. On the other side, the role of 
inequalities on the organic water pollution is strong. In developing countries, a high degree of 
inequalities is thus associated with important water pollution. Furthermore, this inequalities’ impact is 
first expressed indirectly, through their impact on the political variable (indirect effect), thus 
confirming Boyce’s equality hypothesis (1994). Therefore, wealth inequalities, because they reinforce 
power inequalities and lead to a deterioration of political freedoms, also reinforce water pollution.  
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Table A1: Mean values of dependant and independent variables (1988-2003) 
                 
   SO2  emissions
1  Water pollution
2  GDP per cap.
3  Gini Politics
4 
                 
Asia 4,612  0,162  3614,9  0,375  4,26 
Bangladesh 0,5318  0,1585  1373,2  0,306  2,94 
Cambodia 1,1787  0,1497  1576,3  0,463  6,00 
China 8,0655  0,1381  2937,1  0,368  6,94 
India 2,8263  0,1967  2017,6  0,309  2,5 
Indonesia 1,8261  0,1800  2737,5  0,333  5,31 
Korea, Rep  -  0,1231  13380,0  0,335  2,00 
Lao 0,5027  -  1286,1  0,340  6,75 
Malaysia 6,1847  0,1216  7286,6  0,479  4,63 
Mongolia 19,3226  0,185  1440,4  0,321  2,81 
Pakistan 3,6925  0,1791  1778,9  0,377  4,38 
Philippines 3,7988  0,1889  3795,0  0,440  2,31 
Sri Lanka  1,2155  0,1805  2930,4  0,349  3,44 
Thailand 9,1758  0,1744  5799,5  0,437  2,69 
Viet Nam  1,1049  -  1633,6  0,362  6,94 
             
Middle East and North Africa  7,072  0,189  4232,6  0,391  5,16 
Algeria 5,1882  0,243  5262,2  0,377  5,69 
Egypt 4,6415  0,1918  3121,1  0,330  5,69 
Iran 9,6123  0,1587  5363,9  0,432  5,94 
Jordan 12,4528  0,1817  4060,1  0,395  4,44 
Morocco 4,5258  0,1703  3487,4  0,393  4,88 
Tunisia 12,3346  0,1514  5456,3  0,406  5,81 
Turkey 6,3578  0,1772  5908,4  0,417  3,44 
Yemen, Rep  1,4648  0,2526  768,8  0,364  5,38 
             
Afrique Subsaharienne  5,974 0,234  1962,3 0,456  4,76 
Burkina Faso  1,4720  0,2154  955,2  0,457  5,00 
Burundi 0,5079  0,2423  763,9  0,376  6,44 
Cameroon 2,0825  0,2321  1905,4  0,457  6,37 
Côte d'Ivoire  1,6541  0,2238  1600,5  0,398  5,94 
Djibouti 3,0317  -  2173,1  0,447  5,19 
Ethiopia 1,2045  0,2211  782,5  0,405  5,31 
Ghana 0,9208  0,1737  1785,0  0,354  3,94 
Guinea 1,8508  -  1869,5  0,529  6,13 
Kenya 1,3010  0,2364  1060,7  0,477  5,63 
Lesotho -  0,1699  2409,2  0,606  4,31 
Madagascar 1,4830  0,2706  846,7  0,458  2,88 
Malawi 0,7932  0,2803  542,3  0,557  4,13 
Mali 2,6503  -  745,0  0,453  3,19 
Mauritania 4,8120  -  1882,9  0,425  6,25 
Mauritius 3,5068  0,1574 8197,6  0,379  1,25 
Mozambique 2,8735  0,2762  717,2  0,435  4,13 
Niger 1,5874  0,3038  730,8  0,427  5,06 
Nigeria 3,5067  0,1905  844,1  0,469  5,44 
Senegal 2,0745  0,3240  1375,7  0,456  3,56 
South Africa  40,4940  0,1767  8842,6  0,579  2,63 
Swaziland -  0,2647  4109,1  0,555  6,00 
Tanzania 1,8430  0,2518  514,4  0,342  5,13 
Uganda 1,0010  0,2588  1003,2  0,473  5,31 
Zambia 51,8547  0,2296  850,1  0,516  4,31 
Zimbabwe 7,3978  0,1994  2576,9  0,531  5,50 Economic Growth, inequality and environment quality… 
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Table A1 (following): Mean values of dependant and independent variables (1988-2003) 
                 
   SO2  emissions  Water pollution  GDP per cap.  Gini  Politics 
                 
Latin America  11,585  0,231  5563,2  0,514  2,49 
Argentina 5,3485  0,2126  11045,2  0,490  1,94 
Bolivia 4,9876  0,2377  2238,8  0,601  1,75 
Brazil 6,5807  0,1941  6860,8  0,591  2,38 
Chile 91,9979  0,2316  7777,5  0,550  2,31 
Colombia 2,9077  0,1971  5888,3  0,559  3,25 
Costa Rica  2,8036  0,2118  7267,0  0,483  1,00 
Dominican Republic  5,2976  -  5425,8  0,501  2,38 
Ecuador 6,0418  0,2526  3325,9  0,582  2,31 
El Salvador  2,6117  0,1952  4195,2  0,510  2,56 
Guatemala 2,1353  0,2699  3731,1  0,563  3,38 
Honduras 2,9587  0,2151  2841,1  0,553  2,56 
Jamaica 18,4621  0,2889  3517,2  0,415  2,00 
Mexico 13,2596  0,1944  8251,8  0,525  3,25 
Nicaragua 3,7350  -  2873,0  0,463  3,44 
Panama 6,6014  0,2912  5373,7  0,566  2,69 
Paraguay 2,0081  0,2757  4381,8  0,548  3,88 
Peru 15,5098  0,2014  4423,0  0,486  3,63 
Trinidad and Tobago  13,9399  0,2553  8036,0  0,407  1,44 
Uruguay 10,3873  0,2477  8031,3  0,436  1,25 
Venezuela 13,8790  0,2075  5879,8  0,461  2,37 
             
Transition countries  33,645  0,170  6611,1  0,298  3,14 
Albania                   5,9074  0,1955  3113,9  0,289  4,13 
Armenia                   -  0,2064  2318,2  0,381  4,08 
Azerbaijan                -  0,1562  2787,7  0,362  5,85 
Bulgaria                  85,5807  0,1461  6200,7  0,329  2,50 
Croatia                   11,4495  0,1617  8643,9  0,257  3,31 
Czech Republic           52,0943  0,1328  14493,8 0,221 1,00 
Hungary                   35,5842  0,1597  11599,3  0,238  1,63 
Kyrgyz Republic         -  0,1622  1712,8  0,381  4,92 
Lithuania                 -  0,1677  8754,3  0,313  1,15 
Macedonia                 25,7148  0,1714  5833,4  0,354  3,50 
Moldova                   -  0,3139  2018,6  0,336  3,31 
Poland                    32,7720  0,1580  8918,5  0,311  1,75 
Romania                   22,7584  0,1004  6297,9  0,289  3,56 
Russian Federation      -  0,1683  7659,4  0,400  4,19 
Slovak Republic          27,9719  0,1409  10456,0  0,249  1,64 
Ukraine                   -  0,1558  5717,9  0,282  3,44 
             
Whole sample  11,026  0,199  4201,0  0,410  3,87 
Notes: (1) kg per capita; (2) kg per worker; (3) constant US dollars 2000, PPP; (4) the political freedoms index grades 
the countries according to the extent of their political freedom, grade 7 corresponding to a very restrained level of 
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